



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

On Arbitration and Conciliation for non-justiciable disputes.

On Sanctions.
1. Scope. 2. Kinds.

On International Executive.

On Armaments.

Opinions of philosophers concerning possibility of preserving peace shall be considered by States armed for war. (In second edition, 1796.)

World citizenship advocated in addition to national citizenship, so as to promote freedom of travel and intercourse.

Standing armies abolished.

The Court of Nations.

1. Advisory power only.
2. Enforcement only by good-will of litigants and power of public opinion.

International use of armies and navies for police purposes not favored.

1. To enforce enactments of Legislature and decrees of Court.

2. Each State must provide prescribed number of men or amount of money as determined by Legislature.

An International force sent from separate States to International Capital is subject to order of President, and maintained at International expense.

No State may declare war independently, or levy troops beyond fixed number, or interfere with duties of any member of Legislature or Court, without incurring status of international rebel.

International Ministry—15 members (5 Senators and 10 Deputies) chosen annually by their respective branches of Legislature. Each Great Power shall have at least one representative. The Ministry shall elect one of their number President of International State and of Senate. If a Deputy, he becomes Senator for life. His approval gives validity to enactments of Legislature. A measure twice vetoed may become law if approved by majority of Ministry. The seat of International Government is preferably Constantinople; otherwise the Canton of Geneva, made international property. Time of annual meeting—Autumn.

The States shall reduce "simultaneously and proportionally" their national forces to limit indicated by municipal needs, but preserving *relative* power of each State unchanged. No separate State shall call out its additional international contingent, paid by itself, unless authorized by Legislature and duly notified by President.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration; Good Offices and Mediation; International Commissions of Inquiry, occasional or permanent; an International Council of Conciliation, eighty-three members chosen by States according to population, meeting in plenary or partial assemblies; conclusions binding when approved by seven-tenths of the States represented, and representing at least one-half the population of the globe.

1. All conflicts between States shall be settled by the International Judicial organization.

2. First employ "indirect means of constraint," all moral, political, and economic forces. If these fail, national armies and the international navy are "means of direct constraint." No State may use physical force without consent of the other States. If a State is attacked contrary to these regulations, the other States must help it in its defense.

The existing Permanent Administrative Council at the Hague, with an International Permanent Secretary; Administrative Bureau (at Brussels); a Court Office; an International Preparatory Committee of the Conference of the States; and a Financial Committee. The Conference of States may set up a Council of Management in a weak and demoralized State which cannot maintain order.

An International Naval and Military Committee to direct national armies and the international fleet in "collective measures of constraint and defense." This Committee controls all manufacture of arms and munitions of war needed by the States. Use of mines, submarine torpedoes, and poisonous or inflammable gases prohibited.

THE PRINCIPLE OF FREE COOPERATION WITHOUT COMPROMISE

By JULIA GRACE WALES

AT NO time has it been more important than it is today that all peace forces should work together. Is it true that—as unkind rumor has it—the friends of peace are unable to keep the peace among themselves; that the League to Enforce Peace, for example, looks down with the superiority of conscious worldly wisdom upon radical pacifism; that the non-resistants, feeling themselves called to guard the pure essence of truth,

have taken up an attitude little short of belligerent? What is the cause of this and is there any help for it?

Whenever human beings have undertaken any work in the service of humanity, they have found the difficulties of the task itself speedily complicated by internal difficulties of organization and method. In a small or unimportant task, adjustment is usually possible. The difficulty increases in proportion as the task is great and the end vital. Even among people animated by the same high aim and ready to make great sacrifices for it, difference of opinion as to method can sometimes result in complete disintegration of effort.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF	On an International Legis- lature (to enact International law and develop the Interna- tional Organization).	On an International Court.	On Jurisdiction of the Court.
IMMANUEL KANT. 1795.	A Permanent International Congress, representing a feder- ation of democratic States.		Disputes to be settled by recourse to law.
WILLIAM LADD. 1840.	A Congress of Nations.	A Court of Nations, two judges appointed by each gov- ernment represented in the Congress.	Cases brought by mutual consent. Court may propose offices of mediation. Court may propose to the Congress new principles of international legislation.
JAMES LORIMER. Institutes of the Law of Nations. 1884.	International Legislature in two Houses. <i>Senators</i> chosen by central authority in each State serve for life without international salary. <i>Deput-</i> <i>ies</i> , chosen by national legis- latures, or by central author- ity, if no legislature exists. Each State pays <i>Deputies</i> and fixes term. Each great power sends three <i>Senators</i> and fif- teen <i>Deputies</i> . Representa- tion of smaller States based on population, area and volume of business, fixed by Great Powers. Representatives of bankrupt State may neither vote nor sit in Legislature.	International Court in two branches, civil and criminal; fourteen judges and a presi- dent, all appointed for life by International Ministry. Each Great Power shall have one representative. On civil side, judgment determined by a ma- jority of votes.	Questions of public Interna- tional Law, depending on con- struction of treaties or acts of International Government and questions of private Interna- tional Law, appealed from State tribunal with sanction of Government of one contest- ant. Attorney-General, named by International Ministry, may institute civil suits in name of Government, and have charge of prosecutions for international crimes. If he refuses to prosecute, appeal may be taken to Ministry.
HENRI LA FONTAINE. The Great Solution. 1916.	A Conference of States, meeting automatically, at least once in two years on the 18th of May, probably at the Hague. Each State may cast one vote. Conventions adopted by a majority of States shall be- come valid as international law for those States. Dissent- ing States may afterwards signify their adhesion.	An International Court of Justice, consisting of fifteen judges and fifteen deputy judges, elected by the confer- ence of States from an eligible list of candidates nominated by at least five States. Not more than two of the thirty judges may belong to one nation.	A triple jurisdiction is recog- nized, "amicable, arbitral and contentious." The Court shall settle all disputes referred to it by agreement. The Court is open to the States and to their citizens. The Court may recommend improvements in the international judicial or- ganization for consideration by the Conference of States.

Now the root of the difficulty is in the impossibility of agreement on what constitute the "essentials" of a working basis. The radical and religious mind scorns compromise on conscientious grounds. The compromise of a principle is loss of strength. It means backing oneself by a weakened instead of a supreme moral law. On the other hand, there is strength in unity, and dogmatism is itself a weakness. How shall we decide as to what are the essentials without setting ourselves up as superior beings to judge finally of good and evil and to separate the sheep from the goats among our fellows?

Let us take a simple illustration from churches, as presenting the most typical battlegrounds of dogmatic

conviction. A, B, and C are three protestant churches that undertake to reform the world. Each has its own elaborate definition of the "essentials of religion," the effective working basis, a creed of many articles. A has thirty-nine articles, B twenty, C forty. Of these, fifteen articles are held in common. Each propagates his doctrine, endeavoring to convert every one else. A condemns B and C as evil and as holding respectively five and twenty-five articles which are positive error. Consequently A not only attempts to advance itself, but to suppress B and C. In due time, however, the self-destructive effects of this policy become evident to A, B, and C. In order to contend with outside adverse

forces they are obliged to seek a basis of union. They re-examine their own and each other's creeds in an effort to discover a minimum of essentials. The fifteen articles on which they are agreed do not contain, however, the total essentials held by any one of them, and no one of them can concede his own essentials without treason to conviction.

It would seem at first glance that the problem will be insoluble until the leveling process of long mental intercourse has much further modified individual opinions. In this pessimistic view, however, there is speedily found to be a fallacy. As has often been pointed out, it lies in the notion that the union to be sought is necessarily one involving an organization to fulfill all the functions of the original organizations, one which would permit the original organizations to pass out of existence without vital loss. This fallacious notion once removed, the way is, of course, open to an immediate solution of the problem in the principle of federation. According to this principle, at once unifying and free, A, B, and C can, while retaining each his individual creed and organic identity, form also a new organization based on the fifteen common articles. Now it is to be observed that, while the new organization includes the old units so far as membership is concerned, yet the principles on which the new is based do not include all the principles of the smaller organizations. The fifteen common articles represent not the least common denominator of the principles of A, B, and C, but their highest common factor—not the "minimum of essentials," but the maximum of agreement. Each of the inner organizations, moreover, remains free to hold and propagate its own private maximum of conviction. At the same time the three are able to cooperate organically to the extent that the common basis of fifteen articles will permit. Beyond this point they remain free to act independently, and they are under obligations to do so.

But the relation of A, B, and C among themselves as units has meantime changed. It is no longer one of antagonism and the effort at mutual suppression, but one of respect and the recognition of mutual freedom. Each now holds his own view, not dogmatically as absolute truth, but practically and firmly as a working hypothesis. Each holds his mind open to the idea that the other may be right in part at least—may at least have something to contribute to the general progress. Each has come to feel that truth may be trusted in free competition with error, and that the best method of arriving at truth is to encourage every man to hold freely, firmly, clearly his own conviction and to work out his own salvation in his own way.

Let us take another illustration. It is a commonplace of internationalism that in the principle of a federation that does not conflict with the autonomy of racial units, in the complex application of this principle perhaps to federations within federations, lies the best hope of solving the problem of nationality. Now it is worth while to note that the principle applies not only to political organization, but to some of those obstinate mental attitudes which render international political organization so difficult.

It is, of course, obvious that in every racial unit there are profound attachments to language, laws, institutions, art, literature, localities, traditions, customs, associations which cannot be shared in the same degree by persons

who belong to other racial units and who, therefore, possess a different equipment of memory and imagination. These attachments make up the character of the unit, without which it would be deprived of human depth and power and stability of consciousness. That the individual should renounce such attachments would be spiritual expatriation and incalculable loss. It has been the judgment of the pacifist that there is danger, however, of allowing these racial attachments to become too powerful and profound. There are attachments, he contends, that are common to humanity. It is mainly upon these alone, he says, that we must build our corporate consciousness.

Now it is our contention that the weak achievements of pacifism thus far have been largely due to precisely this effort to suppress the passion of national attachments and to render human relations artificially simple where they are naturally complex. The effort of the pacifist, as of every kind of reconstructive worker, should be not to destroy, but to fulfill, not to suppress a dominant characteristic until it assumes a correct proportion—that is retrogression, not progress—but to draw out other characteristics into a symmetrical development. There is no danger of our loving our families too much. There is a great danger of our loving our neighbors too little. And there is danger of our loving our families unintelligently, and forgetting that their welfare is dependent upon the welfare of the community as a whole, and that to wish a selfish happiness for them is to wish them no happiness at all. The patriot of the future will be loyal to a national ideal that will be essentially an ideal of national unselfishness, that is, of national co-operation in the life of the family of nations as a whole. His attachment to his own institutions will give him comprehension of and sympathy with the attachment of other men to institutions which are to him unfamiliar. As he values the freedom of his own national life, he will desire all nations to share that freedom equally. When world consciousness is sufficiently developed, every one will be unsatisfied in having any good thing that all cannot share. He who lives in a hundred men, in their energy, achievement, and happiness, is a hundred times as much alive as one who lives only in himself. Altruism, whether in individuals or nations, is only a question of the size of the self. The nation of the future will realize that its own welfare depends upon, is contained in, and contains the welfare of all. Hence there will be developed a new element in the complex of human relations "the love of a people for people, of nation for nation, binding together the entire family of nations in universal brotherhood." The true internationalism does not rest upon a compromise of national loyalties, but upon their union in a new synthesis large enough to fulfill and perfect the profoundly enriching experiences of national life.

Now, further, the principle of free cooperation can be applied and must be applied to the organization of all forces making for peace.

The internationalist pursuing the ideal of the universal brotherhood with his head in the clouds, only too often finds himself entangled in the mire of sectional controversy. If the religious idealist is finding his way out of the bitter irony of denominational warfare by way of the principle of federation, the internationalist can with advantage follow his example. How far any immediate further organization of peace societies can be

carried is a matter for investigation; it is probable that our energy can go into some more productive kind of effort than that of the machinery of organization; but in any case there is everything to be said for free co-operation on all possible occasions and in every possible aspect of the work—free cooperation without compromise. Each new peace organization has its own essential ideal, that for which it was founded, that which gives it a strength of its own, and without which it would be only a faint imitation of already existing societies. To conserve that essential ideal is a prime duty. And it is not to be expected that other societies can immediately accept all the essentials of a new movement. Yet all other societies have their own inestimable contribution to make. That there should be free give and take among all sincere groups of workers, *mutual respect on points of difference, willingness to unite where there can be union, and to allow each other freedom when there must be independent action*—this is a prime essential of progress in international propaganda.

If we are indeed entering upon a new era of group relationships, in which rivalry is to be transformed into friendship, and in which mutual destruction and waste are to give place to mutual freedom and harmonious co-operation, it is natural to expect the peace organization to lead the way. There are, as we have seen, two ways of propaganda: one is to fight *against* error, with grave danger of mistaking friend for foe and wasting the moral energies of others, as well as our own, to strive to tear evil out by the roots, with danger that tares and wheat will be uprooted together. The other is to work for the good, to liberate the truth as we see it, to scatter it as seed on fruitful soil.

Self-seeking, intrigue, distrust, secrecy, the warping of truth for special ends, a struggle for power, these are the methods of war.

Freedom, democracy, openness, confidence, truth, co-operation, self-forgetfulness, these are the methods of peace. They apply to groups and individuals as well as to governments. If non-resistance is a sound principle, it must apply not only to international relations, but to propaganda. The non-resistant cannot consistently take a hostile attitude to those in authority over him. He must render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's. While he is under obligation to express his own view clearly and to use his vote according to his conviction, he must bow to the will of the majority where group action is concerned, even though he be unable himself to take part in that action. He may offer no resistance save passive resistance, and that only when force is exerted to compel him to do what he judges to be for himself wrong.

But now can the principle be applied in any practical way to the sharp divergence of opinion between the non-resistants and the League to Enforce Peace?

There is one aspect of this problem which it may be worth while to examine first of all in its most simple and abstract form. For the sake of clearness and brevity in discussion, let A, B, and C stand for three possible conditions or courses of action:

Let A equal an actual bad condition.

Let B equal a suggested better condition—a compromise course leading to positive improvement.

Let C equal completely radical and ideal action.

What is the duty of the radical with respect to these three possibilities?

As between A and C or B and C he must, of course, decide for C.

As between A and B it would seem to be obvious that he must decide for B. But here, strange to say, many radicals hesitate. And not infrequently a radical becomes a reactionary by preferring a present evil to a partial improvement.

In explaining his hesitation, the radical reasons thus: "B contains positive evil. I cannot advocate evil. Therefore I cannot advocate B as a course of action. I must throw all my energy into advocating C, though it be but a forlorn hope. Even if A and B are presented to me as the only practical alternatives, I cannot assume any responsibility with respect to them."

It is nevertheless obvious that in refusing to take action—for instance, in refusing to use his vote with regard to A and B—the radical is losing an opportunity to uphold good (the good in B which is not in A) and to prefer it to evil (the evil in A which is not in B). If there is on the whole any difference in moral value between A and B, he cannot escape moral responsibility by being neutral between them.

Our reactionary radical here contends that the continuance of the intolerable conditions A may lead speedily to the radical improvement C, whereas the compromise B may indefinitely postpone further progress. But is not this argument an appeal to opportunism? Does it not counsel doing greater evil that good may come? Is it not itself compromise with a bad condition? Whether or not such a position may in some cases be tenable on the ground of prudential considerations, of opportunism, of compromise itself, it surely cannot be defended on a ground of *no compromise*. Surely it is in opposition to a radicalism which lays down the unqualified principle: We will work for good; we will repudiate evil. Would the radical venture to advocate an actual step back in order the more speedily to attain the same good end? Is it working for good and repudiating evil to advocate deliberately remaining in the rear of any improvement which, in the evolution of group consciousness, has now become politically possible?

"But," the reactionary radical may insist, "the choice is not confined to A and B; it lies between A, B, and C. We repudiate both A and B. We advocate C."

In the case of having to vote for one of the three courses A, B, or C, it is impossible for the voter to express the whole truth of his position by the casting of a single ballot. He has reason to object to such a manner of voting, and to demand an opportunity to express precisely his preference for A over B and for B over A. Let us suppose, however, that so far as voting is concerned such an opportunity is denied. If there is a chance that C will win, the radical will vote for C. If it is fairly certain that C cannot in any case obtain a majority of votes, the duty of the radical is not so clear. In whichever way he votes he will have told only half the truth. In deciding whether he is morally bound to vote for C or for B he will have to consider whether he will regard his vote (1) as an instrument for deciding the practical issue between A and B, or (2) as an instrument for recording his own view and so helping to keep the ideal C before the world; he will have to con-

sider the relative value of his vote in these two functions.

In propaganda, however, in such matters as cooperating with organizations, signing petitions, using his influence in writing, and in public and private speech, the radical is faced with no such dilemma, because he is at liberty to express both his advocacy of C and his preference for B as opposed to A. And here, it seems to us, his obligation is clear. If B is before the public as a practical measure, he cannot escape the responsibility of saying that he prefers B to A, that any progress is better than no progress, though neither can he escape the responsibility of pointing to C as the ultimate ideal.

As regards the problem of the Peace League, if even a very imperfect beginning of international organization can be substituted for the present anarchy, it would seem that even the most radical non-resistant must enthusiastically support the change. But such support need not interfere with his continued advocacy of world disarmament and a fuller form of federation.

We suggest that one who feels conscientious difficulty in, for instance, signing a petition for the Peace League, could meet the difficulty by appending with his signature an explicit statement that, while he is opposed to armament of any kind, and to the entrance of any country into war, while he as an individual cannot give military service, yet he believes that reduction of armaments is better than large armaments; that the beginning of organization is better than anarchy; that to be prepared to use force in defense of world order is better than to be prepared to use force in a selfish national interest; that to those provisions of the proposed league that have not to do with the use of force he gives his unqualified assent, and that as between the present condition and the proposed league, he hopes to see the latter prevail.

It is the theory of the radical that it is always worth while to work immediately for the ideal; that only so can that ideal be kept before the minds of men; that only so can our spirit be kept true to that ideal; but we are unable to see any conflict of principle between this radicalism and the contention of the practical progressive that we must seize every particle of improvement as fast as we can get it.

HOW A NATION MAY ENDURE

By REMBERT G. SMITH, D. D.

HISTORY records the rise and fall of many nations and no great nation has survived for many centuries, except it be China. The cause of the fall of nations has been investigated by many students, and a few of them are quite confident that they know why nations decline and fall. Mr. Roosevelt has recently declared, "The curse of every ancient civilization was that in the end its men became unable to fight. Materialism, luxury, safety, even sometimes an almost modern sentimentality, weakened the fibre of each civilized race in turn; each became in the end a nation of pacifists, and then each was trodden under foot by some ruder people that had kept virile fighting power, the lack of which makes all other virtues useless and sometimes even harmful." This theory was elaborated in the address made by Mr. Roosevelt at Berlin when he was making his world tour. He spoke on the subject of "The Biological

Analogies of History." The contention made in that address was that, as that animal type survives which by its superior strength overcomes other types, so that nation will survive which has the greatest power and proneness to fight. This theory is but the extension of the teachings of Darwin and Haeckel to the problems of political philosophy and an echo of Napoleon's gloomy dictum that God is always on the side of the heaviest artillery.

The theory that the inclination and the ability to fight are the guarantees of national existence should receive the most serious attention at this time by the people of the United States. The historical facts upon which it is based should be carefully examined. When they are casually examined it would seem to be useless to hope for the endurance of nations, since they seem, like individuals, to be under the law of mortality. A deeper study, however, will lead to the belief that there is nothing inherently impossible in the conception of national endurance.

History clearly and repeatedly demonstrates that the nation that takes the sword for conquest perishes by the sword. Such brought about the destruction of Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, Persia, ancient Greece and Rome. The prime cause of their downfall has always been the instinct or the desire to conquer. Nations have, in seeking to gratify this imperialistic ambition, waged wars of conquest and when they have been successful they have come into vast wealth from the robbery of the subjugated peoples. The wealth thus gained has been used in supplying themselves with the luxuries of life, and so they have become flabby and lethargic. While these processes of internal decay have been going on other nations, sometimes moved by covetousness and sometimes by a spirit of hatred and revenge, engendered by the wrongs inflicted upon them, have made successful war upon their former conquerors.

It is true these conquests were made possible because the nations had lost their military prowess, but it must not be forgotten this loss of prowess came indirectly from the military successes of the nation. The conquests of other peoples became the source of wealth and luxury, and these destroyed the nation. If history teaches anything so clearly that he who runs may read it, it is that militarism contains the seed of national decline and death. It is impossible to preserve the pristine virtues of self-sacrifice and endurance in a nation that achieves large military successes. Only in the territory of the ideal may we hope to find the laws of national endurance. The most momentous question at the present time, not only for this nation, but for all nations, is this: Shall Columbia become the Columbus of the nations, and find the way across an uncharted ocean to a new continent of national hopes and ideals? It is true that we should never forget or ignore the lessons of the past, but when those lessons do not contain the truth which is needed, then the wise men or the wise nations will launch fearlessly forth upon untried seas. Faith is the condition not only of individual moral progress, but of national welfare and development. What, then, are